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A B S T R A C T
Over the past 50 years, the European Union (EU) has dramat-
ically increased its policy-making power. However, there
remains considerable variation over time as well as across
policy areas in the relative power of the EU and the member
states. The variation is likely to influence EU-wide bargain-
ing. Following the logic of bargaining games with domesti-
cally constrained actors, or two-level games, the changes
in the bargaining environment may also influence party
competition within the member states of the European
Union. Using manifesto data for 1951–2001, this article
examines convergence of party programmes across Western
Europe. It is shown that European integration has increas-
ingly constrained the range of policy platforms. Moreover,
we generally find a stronger effect if and when countries are
actually members of the EU. European integration bolsters
programmatic convergence of Euro-friendly as well as
Eurosceptic parties. However, European integration particu-
larly influences the convergence of Eurosceptic parties in EU
member states.
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Although the process has not always been a smooth one, it is undeniable that
the institutions of the European Union (EU) have increased dramatically in
importance over the past 50 years. Throughout this period, a defining feature
of the European Union has remained its system of multilevel governance in
which the competencies of the various levels of authority are not clearly sepa-
rated. The EU is still a prime example of power-sharing between national and
supranational authorities. Decision-making power for nearly all policy issues
falls between the national and the EU level. Consequently, it is appropriate
to view European integration as a process by which bargaining power is
shifting from national political institutions to the European supranational
institutions. So far, this has particularly affected the legislative and executive
branches of government, where national governments and parliaments find
themselves weakened relative to the European Commission and, less obvi-
ously, the European Parliament. However, the increasing importance of the
European Court of Justice indicates that a similar shift of power now also
affects the judiciary.
The leading research question of this article is how, if at all, national
polities react to the structural loss of bargaining power relative to EU insti-
tutions. Based on the logic of two-level games, we examine empirically
whether European integration has led to programmatic convergence. The
logic of two-level games suggests that changes in the bargaining environment
may lead to a ‘rallying-around-the-flag’ effect in the member states, in particu-
lar when policies coming from Europe are perceived as a threat to the
domestic status quo. Schelling (1960) argued that, in international negotia-
tions, governments can benefit from the perception of being politically vulner-
able at home, the so-called ‘paradox of weakness’. This conjecture has been
applied to analyse the importance of domestic veto players, as well as the
size of the domestic ‘win-set’, defined as the area of possible outcomes that
can win majority support to change the status quo (Shepsle and Weingast,
1987). Closely related, Putnam’s (1988) thesis states that a smaller domestic
‘win-set’ increases the bargaining power of negotiators in intergovernmental
bargaining (see also, Iida, 1993; Milner and Rosendorff, 1997). Tsebelis (1995,
2002) reasons accordingly that a unified parliament acting as a unified collec-
tive veto-player strengthens the bargaining position of its national govern-
ment, because it is a more effective constraint.
Research into the Schelling or Putnam conjecture has generally evaluated
the outcomes of international negotiations, and analysed whether more
constrained negotiators indeed got a better deal (e.g. König and Hug, 2000;
Hug and König, 2002; Bailer and Schneider, 2006).1 Only a few studies
consider what would seem to be a logical consequence of the Schelling conjec-
ture: if governments benefit from ‘tying their hands’, then they should have
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a strategic incentive to do so. Fearon (1994, 1997), Tarar (2001) and Leventog˘lu
and Tarar (2005) argue that negotiators may create so-called audience costs
by escalating a conflict. Most relevant, however, are the studies by Mo (1994)
and Pahre (1997), which allow for endogenous domestic institutions.
If a unified parliament increases its government’s bargaining power, then
parties may have an interest in presenting a common stance. In other words,
is it indeed the case that European integration has led political parties to
converge to a common unified stance in order to boost national influence at
the European level? Do such strategic considerations affect the policy plat-
forms of all parties similarly? It may be necessary to distinguish between
government and opposition parties, as well as parties that are generally pro-
EU or anti-EU. Finally, the notion of ‘win-set’ suggests that it is only the policy
positions of parties that are needed for a majority in parliament that matter.
Consequently, we test the Putnam thesis specifically for the relevant
minimum winning coalition (MWC) that can be identified in parliament for
a particular policy issue (Riker, 1962; Axelrod, 1970).
There are some recent examples that parties may indeed exhibit such
strategic behaviour. During the 2005 negotiations on the EU budget, the
Labour and Conservative parties in Britain largely agreed on the need to
protect the British rebate and the need for changes in the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. Similarly, in 2004, Greek parties across the political spectrum
converged on the need to protect subsidies to olive growers as well as cotton
and tobacco producers during the negotiations on the reform of subsidy status
for Mediterranean products. Falkner et al. (2005: 333), moreover, note that the
‘world of domestic politics’ does not stop once a common policy has been
agreed. With regard to Great Britain they observe:
For ideological reasons, the Conservative government fought hard against the
Directives at the EU level. The transposition process was then frequently used as
a ‘continuation of decision-making by other means,’ i.e. as an opportunity to
continue combating Directives that were already adopted against the will of the
UK government. (Falkner et al., 2005: 333)
For example, in 1986 the British Conservative government decided to opt out
of the Social Protocol, whereas during the 1980s Labour had supported
harmonization of social policy standards throughout the EU. However,
Labour’s position on this matter changed markedly in the run-up to the
general election of May 1997. Although in 1997 the New Labour government
agreed to sign up to the Social Protocol during the negotiations of the Amster-
dam Treaty, its approach towards implementation was in line with its general
stance to minimize the effects of the directives. Especially with relation to the
Parental Leave Directive, the Employment Relations Act of 1999 incorrectly
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transposed this directive by setting lower rules than were required by the
directive (Falkner et al., 2005: 147–8; Sifft, 2004: 19).
The next section reviews the emerging literature on the impact of
European integration on the convergence of party programmes. The third
section presents a two-level bargaining model to analyse strategic program-
matic convergence. Next, we test whether there has indeed been such conver-
gence in the various member states of the European Union: the fourth section
details the research design, and section five presents the main results. We find
significant effects of European integration on the issue-specific content of
party programmes. European integration bolsters programmatic convergence
of Euro-friendly as well as of Eurosceptic parties, although these parties still
respond differently to this and other external influences. Policy positions of
governing or minimum winning coalitions are less obviously affected by
European integration. The conclusions briefly discuss the implications of our
findings for the study and practice of European integration.
European integration and convergence of party
programmes
There is a growing literature studying the EU impact on the organizational
structure of political parties, in particular on the relationship between national
parties and European parliamentarians and the functioning of European
party families (Hix and Lord, 1997). A further area of consideration has
become the importance of the EU and European issues in domestic electoral
competition. The central research questions here are when political parties
will emphasize their pro- or anti-EU stance, and what are the electoral gains
and losses of such an electoral strategy (Marks et al., 2002).
Yet only very recently scholars have begun to examine the possible
broader impact of European integration on party programmes. A small
number of studies look for evidence in the manifesto data (Budge et al., 2001)
to see whether EU membership influences the policy space in which parties
compete at the national level (Mair, 2000; Binnema, 2002; Hix, 2003; Bernhard,
2004; Nanou and Dorussen, 2004; Pennings, in this issue). These studies
disagree, however, on the precise impact of European integration on party
policy competition as well as on the mechanisms behind the process.
Mair (2000) argues that the process of European integration removes the
political-ideological element from an increasing number of policy issues.
Issues that are in effect determined at the European level eventually get
omitted from the domestic debate, because voters, and by extension parties,
become largely indifferent about them. Ultimately, voters care about the
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impact of their choice on policy outcomes, and they discount ‘empty’
promises. If in the end politics is more about substance than about form, EU-
regulated issues should eventually be left out of political manifestos. It
follows that, as long as a fully democratic debate at the European level is
lacking, voters’ choice is in fact diminished (Mair, 2000: 48–9).
The studies by Hix (2003) and Bernhard (2004) basically agree with Mair’s
(2000) de-politicization argument. Once in government, parties have to abide
by policy commitments that derive from EU membership. Parties are thus
unlikely to advocate policies that contradict such commitments, since they
may be held accountable by their electorates. In order to avoid suffering
electoral penalties, parties prefer to de-emphasize or avoid altogether EU-
regulated issues. Hix (2003: 9–11) argues that the constraining impact of EU
membership causes domestic party competition to shift the focus from policy
content to ‘political beauty contests’ (2003: 10). Voters are asked to choose
between the personalities and managerial abilities of the candidates rather
than their policy platforms. Bernhard (2004) argues that, in order to differen-
tiate themselves, parties focus their competition on issues that do not fall
under the EU decision-making framework. He suggests further that political
parties emphasize their opposition to common European policies if this
accords with their more Eurosceptic position in general. The de-politicization
argument implies that there is an implicit convergence of party platforms,
because EU-regulated issues get deleted from party manifestos.
In contrast, Nanou and Dorussen (2004) argue that European integration
has led to an explicit convergence of party positions since parties are increas-
ingly aware of the constraints on domestic governance. Their research empha-
sizes that the competency of the EU has varied over time and across policy
areas. However, voters still expect parties to take a stance, even for issues that
have become largely EU regulated. Parties avoid making false promises, but
want to differentiate themselves even when faced with a limited range of
feasible positions. Nanou and Dorussen (2004) find empirical support for the
idea that EU integration has led to a convergence of party policy positions.
In agreement with Hix (2003), they find that issues that fall under the
traditional left–right policy space are not removed from party competition
even if they are regulated at the EU level – arguably, because they remain
salient for voters and constitute the central part of the political debate in terms
of ideology. However, like Bernhard (2004: 4), they find that the impact of EU
membership is not the same for all parties. If parties have a real chance of
winning office, they are more constrained by European integration. In
contrast, extreme or protest parties can gain votes by simply (and strategi-
cally) ignoring the reality of European politics.
All studies mentioned so far share the Downsian (1957) assumption that
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parties are vote-maximizers and care about policy only indirectly. Further,
they all analyse European integration as a constraint on the feasible policy
space. However, only Nanou and Dorussen (2004) test the implication that,
if the EU indeed limits the feasible policy space, party programmes should
converge not only within but also across EU member states.
European integration: Loss of national bargaining power
and strategic convergence of party programmes
Here, we explore an alternative explanation for the possible convergence of
party positions. The process of European integration can also be interpreted
as a shift of bargaining power from the national governments to the insti-
tutions of the European Union. How, if at all, could a loss of national bargain-
ing power affect the (strategic) positioning of political parties?
First, we need to consider the basic bargaining situation between the
government of a member state (GOV) and ‘Brussels’ (EU). Admittedly, the
key negotiations within the EU are between governments, but the assump-
tion of negotiations between national governments and EU institutions is
neither very unrealistic nor terribly restrictive. Generally, governments decide
the framework for a common policy, but day-to-day political decisions are
made by the Council of Ministers and implementation of policy is left to the
Commission. The bargaining model does not deny that parties have an
interest in influencing the common policy, but it concentrates on the remain-
ing room for manoeuvre and on setting a national policy that differs from the
common policy.2 As Falkner et al. (2005) observe, the world of domestic
politics also applies to the transposition process. Governments still rely on
parliamentary support for policies that are set under so-called ‘secondary’ EU
legislation, namely regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and
opinions. These vary in the extent and degree of application, from regulations
being binding to opinions having no binding force (Nugent, 2003: 238–40;
Hix, 1999: 103).
Figure 1 illustrates that the eventual agreement or policy outcome will
fall between the ideal points of the government and the common European
policy. If the government could simply ignore the EU, the agreement would
be identical to the GOV ideal point. If the EU had complete power, the govern-
ments of the individual member states would have no choice but to imple-
ment the common European policy as interpreted by ‘Brussels’. Further, as
long as the member states retain veto power, a government concedes only up
to the point (GOVM) that makes it indifferent between the status quo (SQ)
and the eventually accepted position.3
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The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) determines the bargaining outcome
more precisely. The NBS has several desirable properties: it provides a unique
solution, which does not discriminate against any of the negotiators, and it
is Pareto optimal. Assuming equal bargaining power, the NBS splits the differ-
ence between the reservation values of all negotiators within the Pareto-
optimal bargaining space. For example, in Figure 1, the NBS is halfway
between GOV and GOVM (EU). Finally, the solution of its main alternative,
the Stahl–Rubinstein alternative offers game, converges to the NBS when the
time between the offers is reduced (Muthoo, 1999: 52–3). Lacking specific
information about the bargaining protocol – as is common in most inter-
national negotiations – the NBS is thus definitely reasonable. The asymmetric
NBS allows for differences in bargaining power, where more powerful players
obtain more. In Figure 1, if the bargaining power of the EU increases, the
asymmetric NBS predicts an agreement closer to the GOVM. Similar, a
stronger government pushes the outcome closer to its ideal point (GOV).
The need for legislative support or ratification of the agreement creates
a domestic constraint on the international negotiations. In effect, two-level
bargaining games introduce the legislative body as a veto player (VP) and
provide the government with an outside option, which depends on majority
support in parliament and often includes the opposition (Pahre, 1997). By
construction, the NBS depends on the reservation value of the negotiators.
The reservation value is the utility of the outcome that results if the bargain-
ing fails or ‘breaks down’. Typically, the bargaining failure outcome is a
reversal to the status quo ex ante. More specifically in the context of the
politics of the European Union, bargaining failure implies further delay in
determining or implementing a common European policy. Figure 2 explores
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Pareto-optimal
bargaining space
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Figure 1 European integration and bargaining.
how the domestic constraints created by a veto player can benefit the govern-
ment in negotiations with the EU.
By relying on a veto player, the government is able to constrain the
bargaining space to the range VP–VPM, where VPM is the most the veto player
is willing to concede. Given the specific bargaining strength of the veto player
relative to the EU, it is straightforward to determine when a government
prefers to delegate bargaining. As shown in Figure 2, the government prefers
to invoke a veto player if the (a)symmetric NBS of the government and the
EU falls within X. If so, the threat with delegating bargaining to a veto player
is credible. Put differently, given a particular bargaining outcome x, which falls
within the Pareto-optimal bargaining space of the government and the EU, it
is possible to identify a veto player located between the status quo (SQ) and
the government’s ideal point (GOV) that would generate a more preferred
outcome. Figure 2 thus provides a straightforward illustration of Schelling’s
(1960) and Putnam’s (1988) conjecture that greater domestic constraints can
provide a bargaining advantage in international negotiations.
Figure 2 provides further insights into the role of domestic constraints in
international negotiations. Domestic constraints are more valuable to a
government if it has less bargaining power. If the NBS is closer to GOVM, the
government is more likely to rely on a veto player. In this case, the govern-
ment will accept a veto player that is further away from its ideal point. When
a government has more bargaining power, domestic constraints become less
valuable, and the government is more likely to avoid veto players that are
close to the status quo.
However, some additional assumptions are required before we can link
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Figure 2 Bargaining and invoking veto players.
these insights to the strategic incentives of political parties. First, political
parties position themselves in the same policy space as the government and
the institutions of the EU. Secondly, a government has to find a simple
majority in parliament to support any agreement. Thirdly, the ideal point of
the government (GOV) does not necessarily reflect the ideal point of a
majority in parliament, but there is some faction in parliament with an iden-
tical ideal point. Finally, a majority in parliament prefers the ideal point of
the government (GOV) to the common EU policy as well as to the status quo
(SQ). It is helpful to distinguish two further ‘positions’ in the space: parties
located to the ‘left’ of the government’s ideal point (GOV) are more Euroscep-
tic and potential veto players, whereas parties located to the ‘right’ of the
government are more Euro-friendly. To find a majority in parliament, the
government thus has to rely on the support of either Eurosceptic or Euro-
friendly parties.
Eurosceptic parties are potential veto players, but from the perspective
of the government the constraint is desirable only if it provides a better
bargaining outcome. In Figure 3, based on a given (a)symmetric NBS solution,
VP defines the ideal position of the most Eurosceptic party that is a feasible
veto player. In contrast, Euro-friendly parties do not obviously improve the
bargaining position of the government. By definition, these parties are located
further from the status quo than the government and are consequently willing
to accept any bargaining outcome that the government finds acceptable.
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Figure 3 Bargaining and party policy positions.
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However, Euro-friendly parties are willing to support agreements that are
unacceptable to Eurosceptic parties. In effect, they enable the government to
delegate veto power to a party that can reach an agreement close to the
government’s ideal point. Figure 3 depicts the strategic incentives of the
political parties.
Political parties thus vary in their incentive to move their policy platform,
depending on the initial location of their ideal point and their reservation
value. Figure 3 considers these incentives separately. Political parties with an
ideal point in A prefer the outcome of any bargain between the veto player
(VP) and the EU (symmetric NBS) to the outcome of bargaining between the
government and the EU (asymmetric NBS) as well as the SQ. Political parties
located in B prefer the asymmetric NBS between the government and the EU
to the symmetric NBS between the veto player and the EU. However, they
still prefer the outcome of symmetric Nash bargaining between the govern-
ment and the EU to the asymmetric NBS.
Parties in A face a trade-off between their optimal outcome, the symmet-
ric NBS based on their role as veto player, and not being invoked. This trade-
off pushes them towards the ideal position of the government if not being
invoked leads to a less desirable outcome. In contrast, parties in B face a trade-
off between their optimal bargain, the symmetric NBS between the govern-
ment and the EU, and the prospect of veto player bargaining or even
bargaining failure. Again, this trade-off pushes them towards the govern-
ment’s position. The trade-off is only very minor for parties with ideal points
in the overlap of A and B, and we expect them largely to stay put. Finally,
parties with ideal points close to the SQ or the EU ideal point have no incen-
tive to alter their policy positions, since they are not interested in strengthen-
ing the hands of their government. Ultimately, these results depend on the
necessity of the government to find a majority in parliament for any of the
possible outcomes, but also on its choice between using parties in A or B.
To summarize, policy convergence may result from a ‘rallying around the
flag’ effect, in particular when the policies coming from the EU level are
perceived as a threat to the domestic status quo. Political parties may then
converge to a common unified stance in order to boost national influence at
the European level. The bargaining model thus not only illustrates Tsebelis’
(1995, 2002) argument about the importance of a unified parliament within
the context of European politics, but also extends the argument to show that
this provides parties with an incentive to position themselves strategically.
Finally, the analysis shows that not all parties are willing to position them-
selves strategically closer to the government’s ideal point; to be precise,
extremist parties are more likely to stay put.
In the bargaining model, political parties care only about policy and their
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manifestos reflect their policy preferences. Clearly, parties have other inter-
ests as well. They want to gain as many votes as possible and get into office.
The discussion so far has largely ignored the impact of these motives on party
platforms. The empirical analysis controls for these alternative explanations
of programmatic convergences. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to treat party
manifestos as primarily reflecting policy intentions. Arguably, party mani-
festos are intended as much for party members and other political insiders,
such as journalists and fellow politicians, as for the general public, who tend
to remain largely uninformed about and uninterested in their specific content.
Political manifestos may thus very well reflect underlying strategic consider-
ations, including the need to build coalitions to achieve particular policy
outcomes.
The implications of the convergence argument are relatively straight-
forward. Comparing party manifestos within EU member countries, we
should find a convergence of policy positions on issues that are (mainly) regu-
lated at the EU level. Interestingly, the bargaining argument suggests various
ways in which this convergence may take place: between all (mainstream)
parties, between the parties that generally support the government, and
between parties that form a potential minimum winning coalition (MWC).
The next section elaborates on these distinctions and their operationalization.
The bargaining model, however, does not suggest that parties will generally
converge around the common European policy. Quite to the contrary, parties
are expected to converge on a national policy stance that is as distinct as
possible.
Measuring programmatic convergence
Data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) form the basis for our
analysis of programmatic convergence (Budge et al., 2001). The policy
position data are based on party programmes of approximately 172 political
parties in the 15 West European EU member states, covering the period from
1951 to 2001. As a control, we also include party programmes of countries
before they became a member of the EU as well as party programmes from
three European countries – Iceland, Norway and Switzerland – that have not
joined the EU. The models include a dummy variable to test for the effect of
EU membership on programmatic convergence. There are no observations for
Greece prior to 1974, for Portugal prior to 1975 or for Spain prior to 1977,
since, for obvious reasons, we included countries only when they held demo-
cratic elections. In total, the period covers 226 national elections and yields
8844 observations.
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The CMP data allowed us to code party positions for 11 policy areas. In
the manifesto data the units of analysis are (quasi) sentences, and the raw
issue scores measure the salience of a particular issue in a party’s platform.
Salience is converted into policy position by means of scaling.4 For each policy
issue, the party position is the result of subtracting negative from positive
references. Further, the party position data required a transposition of the
original CMP data such that each entry represents the policy platforms of all
parties on a specific policy domain. Hooghe and Marks (2001), continuing
work initiated by Schmitter (1996), provide the information on the level of
EU competency differentiated for 11 policy domains.5
The distance between party positions is measured by the range of policy
alternatives. A smaller distance or range indicates a convergence of 
policy positions (see also Hix, 2003). The dependent variables of the party
policy data (Range, Range_GOV, Range_MWC, Range_proEU, Range_antiEU)
are all indicators of the compactness of the policy space, measured as the
range of the party scores on a given issue dimension for a specific country
and electoral confrontation. The data are interpolated for the years in between
election campaigns. A smaller range indicates that parties are more unified
on the specific policy issue. The variables, however, differ in the subset of
parties used in the calculations.
Range is an indicator of convergence of the positions of all mainstream
political parties. It followed from the bargaining model that convergence
should mainly apply to mainstream parties. Consequently, we control for the
impact of protest or extreme parties by excluding parties that attained less than
5% of the popular vote. Arguably, Range may still include parties that are
largely irrelevant for finding a majority in parliament. Therefore, we also
include measures of the range of party positions that should have direct
relevance. Range_GOV is an indicator of convergence among the positions of
the parties that are in the governing coalition. This measure can, however, be
criticized for ignoring that (part of) the government may look for parlia-
mentary support on a particular issue outside the incumbent parties. The
implications of the bargaining model presented above clearly rely on such
strategic behaviour. Range_MWC indicates the range of positions of the parties
that are members of the most compact minimum winning coalition (MWC).
To the best of our knowledge, nobody so far has considered the range of
the minimum winning coalition. The basic idea is that European integration
leads to more compact MWCs. Operationally, we have to address several
issues. First of all, compactness needs to be defined relative to a particular
party. We use the party that represents the median voter.6 Second, we need
to determine the most compact subset of the party policy space that encom-
passes more than 50% of the votes. A minimum winning coalition has less
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than 50% if one party is excluded. Table 1 illustrates how we can identify the
most compact MWC.
In the example of Table 1, Party C represents the median voter, and there
are several MWCs that include C, namely {ABC}, {BCD}, and {CE}.
Range_MWC is the range of the MWC with the smallest distance between its
extreme members. Considering the distances of all relevant MWCs, dist{ABC}
= 10, dist{BCD} = 4, and dist{CE} = 6. So, the MWC that we are looking for
is {BCD} with Range_MWC = 4.7
Range_proEU and Range_antiEU rely on the general attitude towards
European integration as measured in the CMP. Pro-EU (anti-EU) parties have
more positive (negative) than negative (positive) references to European inte-
gration in their political manifestos. Parties without any positive references
are included in Range_antiEU.
The extent of European integration is the main independent variable. The
variable measures whether policy competency has shifted from the national
to the EU level. Data are based on expert evaluations of the level of European
integration for the various policy domains based on existing treaty obligations
and obligations undertaken subsequently. The original data code the extent
of EU authority from 2 (absent) to 5 (exclusively EU). However, observations
are only rarely coded at the highest levels. European integration is a dummy
variable measuring the existence of any European constraints on national
policy-making (i.e. the levels 2 and above). The interaction term EU member
x European integration picks up whether the impact of increased EU policy
competency is unique to EU member states. The models also include a trend
variable (Years of EU constraints) measuring the number of years since the
introduction of EU constraints. The prediction is a negative relation between
European integration and policy divergence.
The main control variables are characteristics of political systems and
external (non-EU) constraints. If the number of parties increases, one is more
likely to find divergence of party positions. Therefore, the specification
includes two institution-specific controls. First, a Three-party dummy
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Table 1 Range of minimum winning coalitions: an example
Party Vote (%) Cumulative vote (%) Position
A 10 10 –10
B 20 30 –3
C 25 55 0
D 10 65 1
E 35 100 6
distinguishes between party systems with two or three parties (1) and those
with more than three parties (0). This roughly separates between majori-
tarian (generally with only two or three parties) and proportional party
systems (generally with more than three parties). Further, the effective
number of parties (Effective no. of parties) is used as an institution-specific
control. This variable takes into account the number of parties as well as their
relative size (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979: 4).
European integration is, however, not the only external factor that has
been suggested as a cause of party policy convergence. Schmidt (2001) and
Kitschelt et al. (1999), among others, argue that globalization also affects the
national political context. Globalization has put common pressures on all
states, particularly when located in a specific geographical region. Conse-
quently, European states may converge on similar best-response strategies,
and one of the functions of the EU is to formulate a common response to the
external pressures of globalization. In contemporary capitalist economies,
globalization may thus also explain the convergence of party positions with
respect to socioeconomic issues.
Globalization arguments suggest that convergence will be strongest in
small and open economies. We include Population and Openness, the size of a
country’s exports and imports relative to its GDP, from the Penn World Tables
6.1 (Gleditsch, 2002). We also control for the possible effect of economic
development (GDP). The control variables are lagged to precede national elec-
tions (and thus the formulation of party programmes). The Trend variable
controls for any convergence of party programmes over time. Since the esti-
mation relies on panel data, it needs to be corrected for any correlation of
group-specific measurement errors with the dependent variable. Fixed-effects
generalized least squares (GLS) models provide the appropriate correction in
our case (Greene, 2003: 283–338).
Findings
The main finding is that, as expected, European integration reduces the range
of party policy positions, and the constraining effect increases with the
number of years the EU has gained policy competency in a given issue area.
Moreover, we generally find a stronger effect if and when countries are
actually a member of the EU.
Model 1 in Table 2 presents the results of the fixed-effects models applied
to the range of party positions for all (main) parties. European integration is
negatively related to the range of policy positions, but the coefficient is
insignificant. The coefficient for EU membership is positive but not statisti-
cally significant either; in other words, there is no clear difference in the range
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of party positions between EU and non-EU members. However, the negative
and significant coefficient of the interaction term (EU member x European inte-
gration) shows that EU-level competency reduces the range of policy posi-
tions, particularly in EU member states.8 The coefficient for Years of EU
constraints is also negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that the
range of policy platforms reduces if more years have passed since the EU (or
one of its predecessors) obtained policy authority in a particular issue area.
The findings for the control variables are largely as expected. The range
of policy positions is smaller in party systems with only two or three parties.
If the (effective) number of parties increases, the range of policy positions also
increases. There is weak support for the idea that party positions diverge more
in larger countries. Party positions also seem more alike in richer and more
open economies. Finally, there is a trend towards divergence of party
programmes over time. These findings corroborate the convergence observed
by Hix (2003), Nanou and Dorussen (2004) and Bernhard (2004). Given that
the results presented here are based on a time- and policy-specific evaluation
of European integration, they provide strong and precise evidence for an EU
effect on party policy positions.
A possible critique of the first model is that it fails to demonstrate that
policy convergence is the result of the logic of bargaining models. The
bargaining model suggests that the unifying effect of European integration
should not be similar for different subsets of parties. Models 2 and 3 examine
the policy convergence of coalitions of parties that would be actually or poten-
tially involved in sanctioning any agreement between their government and
the EU. Further, Models 4 and 5 contrast the effect of European integration
on Euro-friendly rather than Eurosceptic parties.
Model 2 considers the range of policy positions of parties that are actually
in government. Among parties in government, we find that European inte-
gration correlates only weakly with policy convergence. The coefficients for
European integration and the interaction term between EU member and
European integration, although still negative, are no longer significant. Exclud-
ing the interaction term, however, the effect of European integration is negative
and significant (see the Appendix9). Controlling for all other variables,
governments in EU member countries tend to have more divergent policy
positions. The actual governing coalition may matter less than the existence
of any winning coalition willing to ratify an agreement. However, the findings
for the minimum winning coalitions provide no clear support for this idea.
In model 3, the coefficients of European integration and EU member, as well as
the interaction term, are negative but generally not significant. Even exclud-
ing the interaction term, the effect of European integration on the Range_MWC
is significant only at the 10% level. The only clear finding is that, if more years
have passed since the increase in EU competence, the range of MWCs is
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Table 2 European integration and party policy convergence: GLS fixed-effects estimators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Range Range_GOV Range_MWC Range_proEU Range_antiEU
Constant 4.9803 2.5490 1.4838 3.1878 3.0385
(0.4432)*** (0.3992)*** (0.1993)*** (0.4772)*** (0.5875)***
European integration –0.3888 –0.3130 –0.0811 –0.9496 –0.1021
(0.2648) (0.1951) (0.1454) (0.2291)** (0.3505)
EU member 0.3809 1.0611 –0.2066 1.1395 –0.6238
(0.2692) (0.2000)*** (0.1232)* (0.2250)*** (0.3307)*
(EU member  European integration) –0.9329 –0.3165 –0.1890 –0.0549 –1.0923
(0.2786)*** (0.2177) (0.1450) (0.2634) (0.3721)***
Years of EU constraints –0.0177 –0.0142 –0.0103 –0.0296 –0.0019
(0.0094)* (0.0076)* (0.0048)** (0.0085)*** (0.0128)
Three-party –0.7610 –1.0054 –0.0748 0.1949 –0.7588
(0.1648)*** (0.1290)*** (0.0829) (0.1805) (0.2143)***
Effective no. of parties 0.4971 0.3638 0.2195 0.3751 0.4826
(0.0616)*** (0.0545)*** (0.0296)*** (0.0540)*** (0.0924)***
Population/1000 0.0426 –0.0561 –0.0000 –0.0684 0.0485
(0.0154)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0061) (0.0170)*** (0.0255)*
GDP/1000 –0.1018 –0.0018 –0.0580 –0.0725 0.0548
(0.0410)** (0.0306) (0.0159)*** (0.0337)** (0.0470)
Openness –2.4436 0.2862 –0.4782 –0.8936 1.7596
(0.3857)*** (0.3095) (0.1884)** (0.4073)** (0.5070)***
Trend 0.0596 –0.0061 0.0268 0.0953 –0.0548
(0.0165)*** (0.0124) (0.0070)*** (0.0151)** (0.0207)***
N (number of groups) 8559 (198) 8548 (198) 6544 (196) 7217 (198) 6993 (198)
Wald x2 19.12*** 18.90*** 9.95*** 31.12*** 13.49***
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
significantly reduced. Regardless, in models 2 and 3, we cannot distinguish
EU and non-EU members concerning the effect of European integration.
In model 2, the effects of the controls are not immediately obvious. Large
countries have less policy divergence among government parties, and
economic conditions (GDP and Openness) are not significant. A possible
reason is that coalition governments are particularly common in small, open
economies. In the Range_MWC model (model 3), the effects for the insti-
tutional and economic control variables are more commonsensical. There is
more divergence in proportional systems, but less in more open economies.
Model 4 considers the range of policy positions of parties that are pro-
EU, and the final model (model 5) evaluates the policy range of neutral and
anti-EU parties (excluding Euro-friendly parties). The bargaining model
suggests that convergence should be stronger in the second case, because
Euro-friendly parties are less able (or even willing) to improve national
bargaining power. Eurosceptic parties, however, can function as credible
constraints. We indeed find a more significant effect of European integration
if we exclude Euro-friendly parties. The effect of European integration on the
party position of Euro-friendly parties inside and outside the EU cannot be
distinguished. In model 4, the negative coefficient of European integration is
strong and significant, but the effect of the interaction term is insignificant. A
reasonable explanation is that parties with a positive attitude towards
European integration find themselves generally in agreement on common
European policies.
The dynamics among Eurosceptic parties is quite different, as shown in
model 5. Here, the effects of European integration on Eurosceptic parties in
and outside the EU can easily be distinguished (as shown by the significant
coefficient of the interaction between EU member and European integration). By
itself, however, European integration is not significant (regardless of whether
the interaction term is included or not). With respect to the other control vari-
ables, too, Eurosceptic parties are quite different from Euro-friendly parties.
Eurosceptic parties resist the converging influence of globalization (as shown
by the strong positive coefficient for openness in model 5), whereas openness
leads to convergence of the positions of Euro-friendly parties.
In summary, there is consistent support for the idea that European inte-
gration leads to a convergence of party policy positions. The effect is gener-
ally, but not always, unique to actual members of the EU (or one of its
predecessors). Moreover, European integration particularly influences the
convergence of Eurosceptic parties in EU member states. This finding is
particularly interesting from the perspective of bargaining models, because
these parties are especially valuable as constraints. The policy positions of
governing and minimum winning coalitions, in contrast, are less obviously
Dorussen and Nanou European Integration and Party Programmes 2 5 1
affected by European integration. In particular, the lack of a strong finding
for minimum winning coalitions is disappointing from the perspective of
bargaining models.
Conclusions
There is little doubt that, over the past 50 years, the process of European inte-
gration has increasingly affected politics in Europe. The governments of all
European countries – and quite a few non-European countries as well – now
have to deal with powerful European institutions on a broad variety of issues.
In many respects, the interaction between the governments of European
countries and the institutions of the European Union follows the logic of
bargaining with domestic constraints. The logic of two-level games applies
where governments have to seek domestic support for any agreement reached
at the international level. Schelling (1960) and Putnam (1988) derive the main
conclusions of such models, namely the so-called ‘paradox of weakness’ or
the bargaining advantages of a smaller domestic ‘win-set’. We have argued
that two-level bargaining models may also be used to explain strategic posi-
tioning by political parties.
In our opinion, the empirical analysis convincingly demonstrates that
European integration has reduced the range of policy positions in Europe.
Further, the results suggest that it is possible to attribute such convergence, at
least partly, to the logic of bargaining models. These findings add to the
emerging body of literature that demonstrates that the process of European
integration influences the policy options that political parties advocate in the
various European countries. So far, the evidence clearly points towards less
divergence of policy options, with obvious implications for the quality of demo-
cratic debate in Europe. The bargaining model suggests that national parlia-
ments may well unify to bolster a national position that differs from a common
European policy. Not only may governments take an opposing position during
the negotiation process, but subsequently they can also decline to implement
any agreement properly (Falkner et al., 2005: 278). In both instances, they may
find themselves strengthened in their ‘obstinacy’ by a unified parliament.
Notes
This paper has equal authorship and contains work in progress for Nanou’s PhD
(ESRC funded: PTA-030-2004-00215). Earlier versions of this paper were presented
at the Political Economy seminar of the Departments of Government and Econ-
omics at the University of Essex, 7 February 2005, and at the Groningen workshop
on Partisan Politics, Political Autonomy and Policy Harmonization across Europe,
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19–20 May 2005. We would like to thank the participants at both seminars, with
special thanks to Richard Berthoud, Jakob de Haan, Abhinay Muthoo, Thomas
Plümper, Marian de Vooght and Hugh Ward.
1 The literature on two-level games in international relations generally argues
that domestic constraints help countries to achieve a better deal in inter-
national negotiations. Writing specifically about the politics in the EU area,
the argument is occasionally turned around. Moravcsik (1994) and Hosli
(2000), for example, argue that constraints set by the EU provide national
government with more bargaining power relative to their national parlia-
ments. Both arguments suggest that parliaments have a strategic interest in
a unified position, but the implications for the behaviour of particular parties
may be quite different. Here, we follow the former set-up.
2 The assumption is not very restrictive, because the common EU policy can
also be interpreted as the intergovernmental bargaining outcome were the
other EU members able to ignore the preferences of a particular government
with an ideal point relatively close to the status quo. Schneider and Cederman
(1994) analyse an intergovernmental bargaining model with a ‘laggard’
government.
3 In Figure 1, the maximum the government is willing to concede (GOVM) is
put at the common EU policy (EU). In Figure 3, the asymmetric NBS is also
set at GOVM to keep the graph as simple as possible. It is straightforward to
relax these assumptions without significantly altering the conclusions. All
figures assume symmetric, single-peaked preferences that are separable
across issue domains.
4 Pelizzo (2003) criticizes the use of the manifesto data to determine policy posi-
tions. Budge et al. (2001) and Laver and Budge (1992) defend the practice.
We have to admit, however, that there is a risk that our data combine infor-
mation on salience and direction of policy programmes. We have been careful
to avoid apparent convergence on zero values. Moreover, we excluded issue
domains for which we could not construct a scale, for example environmental
politics.
5 The Appendix, which can be found on the EUP webpage, provides precise
information on the correspondence between issue dimensions in the CMP
and the Hooghe and Marks (2001) data. The Appendix further contains
descriptive statistics.
6 Ordering all voters from ‘left’ to ‘right’ on a particular issue, the median voter
has half or more of all voters on each side. The median voter theorem holds
that the party that takes the position of the median voter cannot lose in a
majority contest (Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 12). Listing all parties from ‘left’
to ‘right’ on a particular issue, the party that represents the median voter has
50% or more of the voters to its left or right, including the percentage of votes
for the median party.
7 Riker (1962) introduced the idea of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs).
Axelrod (1970) elaborated the notion of MWCs by focusing on connected
minimum winning coalitions. A connected MWC includes all parties that are
located between parties that are members of an MWC; even excluding them
would leave the coalition with more than 50% of the vote. Since we focus on
the range of positions of the most extreme parties of the MWC, the distinc-
tion is inconsequential for our research purposes.
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8 The correlations between European integration, EU member and the interaction
terms are relatively modest, namely 0.13, 0.68 and 0.55, respectively. Further,
the correlation between the Trend variable and Years of EU constraints is 0.5,
and between Three-party and Effective no. of parties is –0.48. The Appendix,
which can be found on the EUP webpage, also contains the coefficients of the
models excluding the interaction term. Most importantly, excluding the inter-
action term, the effect of European integration is negative and significant in all
five models.
9 The Appendix can be found on the EUP webpage.
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